



"Cybersecurity and the Broadcast Station"

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Texas A&M University



"Cybersecurity and the Broadcast Station"

Advertised Presentation Scope:

The broadcast technical plant relies on Information Technology (IT) and the Internet Protocol (IP) infrastructure whether a small radio station or a state of the art ATSC 3 TV facility, Protecting the infrastructure against cyber threats grows more challenging each year for the broadcast IT engineer. Threats can vary from emailed ransomware to potential piracy of ATSC 3.0 signals to overall disruption of broadcast content. It is essential to know your vulnerabilities and potential exposure to cyber criminals and implement the necessary precautions. This presentation will outline key cybersecurity principles and provide practical prevention steps you can take to mitigate cyber threats to broadcast facilities of any size.

AGENDA:


Cybersecurity Principals & Foundation
Threats & Threat Actors (ransomware focus)
What About ATSC 3?
Mitigation & Prevention Tasks
Takeaway Thoughts & Resources



What is Cybersecurity

• Cybersecurity is focused upon the protection of computers, networks, programs and data from change, destruction, or disruption.







Cyber attack focus areas:

System tampering
(network infrastructure, servers, hosts)
Sensitive information access / tampering / extortion
Operational disruption
Data encryption extortion

• Risks:

- Dead Air
- Impact Upon Resources
- Loss of Revenue
- Public Embarrassment
- Breach of Data
- Potential Liability
- Lost Trust



Cybersecurity Rules & Regulation for Broadcast **Stations**

Federal Communications Commission

FCC-CIRC2210-04

FCC Warns of EAS Vul **Broadcasters to Take**

MAY 5, 2020







The FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bure malicious cyber activity could expose vulnerabilities

The FCC says there have been incidents of EAS equip which leave the equipment vulnerable to Internet-ba secure from cyberattacks that can disable the equipr

The FCC recommends that broadcasters change mar should also be changed after personnel changes or se computer. The FCC also advises for EAS equipment t

The FCC has published a best practices guide with su

If you have questions about the FCC's warning on EA

Before the **Federal Communications Commission** Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of)
Amendment of Part 11 of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Emergency Alert System) PS Docket No. 15-94
Wireless Emergency Alerts) PS Docket No. 15-91
Protecting the Nation's Communications Systems from Cybersecurity Threats) PS Docket No. 22-329

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING*


Adopted: [] Released: []


Comment Date: (30 days after date of publication in the Federal Register) Reply Comment Date: (60 days after date of publication in the Federal Register)

Key Cybersecurity Principals

Defense-in-Depth

Defense in Depth Layers





Least Privilege





CIA Triad

- Can be equated to Privacy! • Preventing information (data integrity) to be Preventing information (data) to reaching the wrong hands (unauthorized users) • Restrict / Limit access - "Need-to-Access" · Often the target of Social Engineering

 - Implemented by:
 - · Data encryption
 - · Passwords / 2-factor authentication
 - · Off-Line data storage
- changed through an IT workflow and originating at a known source (source integrity) · Change when traversing a network · Change when stored · Change during processing · Implemented by: · File access controls Checksums Encryption CIA Must include detection mechanism(s) **TRIAD**

AVAILABILITY


- · Insuring resources are available!
- Network
- · Servers (infrastructure)
- Applications
- · Often the target of:
- · "DoS" or "DDoS" attacks
- Ransomware
- Implemented by:
- Redundancy network infrastructure
- Redundancy auto-failover servers
- · Intrusion detection

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/framework



- National Institute for Standards & Technology "NIST"
 - Provides a structured outline of best practices
 - Industry guideline baseline
- 5 Framework Core Areas:
 - Identify all IT assets & create policy
 - Protect control access, encrypt data
 - Detect monitor network activity
 - Respond business continuity plan
 - Recover restore impacted areas



Function Unique Identifier	Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category
ID	Identify	ID.AM	Asset Management
		ID.BE	Business Environment
		ID.GV	Governance
		ID.RA	Risk Assessment
		ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy
		ID.SC	Supply Chain Risk Management
PR	Protect	PR.AC	Identity Management and Access Control
		PR.AT	Awareness and Training
		PR.DS	Data Security
		rk.ir	information Protection Processes and Procedures
		PR.MA	Maintenance
		PR.PT	Protective Technology
DE	Detect	DE.AE	Anomalies and Events
		DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring
		DE.DP	Detection Processes
RS Respond RS.RP Re		RS.RP	Response Planning
		RS.CO	Communications
		RS.AN	Analysis
		RS.MI	Mitigation
		RS.IM	Improvements
RC	Recover	RC.RP	Recovery Planning
		RC.IM	Improvements
		RC.CO	Communications

Function	Category	Subcategory
	Data Security (PR.DS): Information and records (data) are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.	PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is protected
		PR.DS-2: Data-in-transit is protected
		PR.DS-3: Assets are formally managed throughout removal, transfers, and disposition
	W.	
		PR.DS-4: Adequate capacity to ensure availability is maintained
		PR.DS-5: Protections against data leaks are implemented

PR.DS-2: Data-in-transit is protected CIS CSC 13, 14 **COBIT 5** APO01.06, DSS05.02, DSS06.06 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.2 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A 13 2 3 A 14 1 2 A 14 1 3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-8, SC-11, SC-12

SC-8 TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY

<u>Control</u>: The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of transmitted information.


Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks and all types of information system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., servers, mobile devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines). Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and/or integrity of organizational information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., by employing protected distribution

systems) or by logical means (Control Enhancements: commercial providers offering dedicated services (i.e., service (1) may find it difficult to obtain tl security controls for transmissi determine what types of confid telecommunication service pac security controls and assurance organizations implement appro additional risk. Related control

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to [Selection (one or more): prevent unauthorized disclosure of information; detect changes to information] during transmission unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical safeguards].

Supplemental Guidance: Encrypting information for transmission protects information from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect information integrity include, for example, cryptographic hash functions which have common application in digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes. Alternative physical security safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related control: SC-12







Threats & Threat Actors

(ransomware focus)



Cybersecurity Sources & Threats



- Malicious Source:
 - Hacktivist
 - Nation states
 - Terrorist groups
 - "Black Hat" malicious hacker
 - Script "kiddies"
 - Cyber Gangs / organized crime
 - Disgruntled employee
- Non-Malicious Source:
 - Accidental actions
 - Natural disasters



BlackCat (ALPHV) • Malware:

Black Basta


Hive

- Ransomware
- Virus
- Worms
- Trojan
- Spyware (key logger)
- Rootkit
- Infrastructure / Network:
 - DHCP Snooping
 - ARP Spoofing (IP Address Spoofing)
 - Rogue Router Advertisements
 - Denial of Service Attacks DoS
 - Distributed Denial of Service Attacks DDoS
 - Application Layer Attacks

"CIA" Triad & the "Hacker"



- Breaching organization's data
- Decoding encryption
- Exposing sensitive information
- Social engineering attacks



Integrity


- Man-in-the Middle attacks
- Embedded malware
- Data record manipulation
- Social engineering attacks

Availability

- Denial of Service (DoS) attack
- Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack
- Network outages
- Ransomware
- Viruses / Malware
- Infrastructure damage



The Cybersecurity Attack






1st Step in Network Security



Network Reconnaissance What Can You Learn?





DASDEC-II



▼ Scan Cai Target: 128.194.247.138 ▼ Profile: Intense scan Command: nmap -T4 -A -v 128.194.247.138 Nmap Output Ports / Hosts Topology Host Details Scans nmap -T4 -A -v 128.194.247.138 OS • Host dasdec-tv-ebs106d Starting Nmap 7.01 (https://nmap.org) at 2017-04-16 10:28 Central NSE: Loaded 132 scripts for scanning. NSE: Script Pre-scanning. Initiating NSE at 10:29 Completed NSE at 10:29, 0.00s elapsed Initiating NSE at 10:29 Completed NSE at 10:29, 0.00s elapsed Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 10:29, 4.91s elapsed (1000 total ports) Initiating ARP Ping Scan at 10:29 Scanning 128.194.247.138 [1 port] Completed ARP Ping Scan at 10:29, 0.05s elapsed (1 total hosts) Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 10:29 Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 10:29, 0.00s elapsed Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 10:29 Scanning dasdec-tv-ebs106ddd.kamu.tamu.edu (128.194.247.138) [1000 ports] Discovered open port 80/tcp on 128.194.247.138 Discovered open port 443/tcp on 128.194.247.138 Discovered open port 22/tcp on 128.194.247.138 Discovered open port 631/tcp on 128.194.247.138 Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 10:29, 4.91s elapsed (1000 total ports) Initiating Service scan at 10:29 Scanning 4 services on dasdec-tv-ebs106ddd.kamu.tamu.edu (128.194.247.138) Completed Service scan at 10:29, 15.18s elapsed (4 services on 1 host) Initiating OS detection (try #1) against dasdec-tv-ebs106ddd.kamu.tamu.edu (128.194.247.138) NSE: Script scanning 128.194.247.138. Initiating NSE at 10:29 Completed NSE at 10:29, 7.10s elapsed Initiating NSE at 10:29 Completed NSE at 10:29, 0.00s elapsed Nmap scan report for dasdec-tv-ebs106ddd.kamu.tamu.edu (128.194.247.138) Host is up (0.00017s latency). Not shown: 995 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION OpenSSH 6.9 (protocol 2.0) 22/tcn onen ssh ssh-hostkev: 1024 b7:24:25:72:89:f1:d3:8b:5a:82:44:0b:86:58:89:4c (DSA) 2048 e4:96:eb:de:a0:b5:65:b5:30:ab:aa:57:f5:09:5e:f8 (RSA) _ 256 e2:54:4a:21:b2:66:c0:b6:46:ec:17:7b:ae:1e:f3:63 (ECDSA) Apache httpd 2.2.26-31 ((Unix)) 80/tcp open http Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS TRACE Potentially risky methods: TRACE http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry http-server-header: Apache/2.2.26-31 (Unix) _http-title: ******The Digital Alert Systems DASDEC Base Page****** 443/tcp open ssl/http Apache httpd 2.2.26-31 ((Unix)) http-methods: Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS http-server-header: Apache/2.2.26-31 (Unix) _http-title: Bad request! ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DASDEC/organizationName=DigitalAlertSystemsLLC/ stateOrProvinceName=UT/countrvName=US | Issuer: commonName=DASDEC/organizationName=Digital Alert Systems LLC/ stateOrProvinceName=Utah/countrvName=US Public Key type: rsa Public Key bits: 1024 Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption Not valid before: 2016-06-07T15:15:44 Not valid after: 2036-06-02T15:15:44 MD5: f995 a7ff 79ec b560 3755 6b82 a27f 6225 _SHA-1: b154 ea45 97f9 7bdc 4dc9 ed1e fdce 7195 790e 56ca ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time

631 - IPP Discovered open port 80/tcp on 128.194.247.138 Discovered open port 443/tcp on 128.194.247.138 Discovered open port 22/tcp on 128.194.247.138 Discovered open port 631/tcp on 128.194.247.138

```
NOT SHOWN: 332 TITLELED DOLLS
PORT
               SERVICE VERSION
        STATE
                        OpenSSH 6.9 (protocol 2.0)
22/tcp
        open
 ssh-hostkev:
   1024 b7:24:25:72:89:f1:d3:8b:5a:82:44:0b:86:58:89:4c (DSA)
   2048 e4:96:eb:de:a0:b5:65:b5:30:ab:aa:57:f5:09:5e:f8 (RSA)
   256 e2:54:4a:21:b2:66:c0:b6:46:ec:17:7b:ae:1e:f3:63 (ECDSA)
                        Apache httpd 2.2.26-31 ((Unix))
80/tcp
              http
        open
 http-methods:
   Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS TRACE
   Potentially risky methods: TRACE
 http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
http-server-header: Apache/2.2.26-31 (Unix)
http-title: ******The Digital Alert Systems DASDEC Base Page*
443/tcp open ssl/http Apache httpd 2.2.26-31 ((Unix))
```

Port:


80 - HTTP

22 - SSH

443 - HTTPS

A Focus on Ransomware

- What is Ransomware?
- Evolving malicious malware:
 - Encrypts files
 - May block system access
 - May disclose sensitive information
- Ransom demand (\$\$\$ bitcoins \$\$\$):
 - De-encrypt (restore) files
 - Not disclose information
- Generic types:
 - Locker ransomware impact to host functions
 - Crypto ransomware individual files encrypted
- Many variants today continues to evolve!



Cryptolocker





Ransomware Variants

- First ransomware appears in 1989
- Revil / Sodinokibi
 - File encryption increasing ransom over time
- Maze
 - File encryption & threat of public release of sensitive information
- Ryuk
 - File encryption & system access blocked
- Tycoon
 - File encryption targets VPN encryption
- NetWalker
 - File encryption targets network connected Windows hosts

Dear Customer:

It is time to pay for your software lease from PC Cyborg Corporation.

Complete the INVOICE and attach payment for the lease option of your choice.

If you don't use the printed INVOICE, then be sure to refer to the important reference numbers below in all correspondence. In return you will receive:

a renewal software package with easy-to-follow, complete instructions; an automatic, self-installing diskette that anyone can apply in minutes.

Important reference numbers: A5599796-2695577-


The price of 365 user applications is US\$189. The price of a lease for the lifetime of your hard disk is US\$378. You must enclose a bankers draft, cashier's check or international money order payable to PC CYBORG CORPORATION for the full amount of \$189 or \$378 with your order. Include your name, company, address, city, state, country, zip or postal code. Mail your order to PC Cyborg Corporation, P.O. Box 87-17-44, Panama 7, Panama.

Press ENTER to continue

- Satan
- Netwalker
- Cerber
- Egregor
- Hostman
- WannaCrv
- Philadelphia
- MacRansom
- Atom
- FLUX
- Tox
- REvil
- Ryuk
- Encryptor
- Fakben
- ORX Locker
- Alpha Locker
- Hidden Tear
- Janus
- Ransom3

Delivering Ransomware

- email Phishing
 - email attachments (malicious)
 - email links (malicious)
- "Drive-By" file download
 - Exploit kit downloaded
- Protocol (RDP) exploit
- Macro execution
- External USB "candy drop"
- Pirated software
- Popular tactics:
 - Spear-phishing target specific audience
 - Whaling spear-phishing target at upper level (C suite)
 - Smishing/vishing SMS based focused on personalization & urgency
- Popular tricks:
 - Playing off emotions (establish trust)
 - Pretexting
 - Wide-net phishing (common service based)





Social Engineering

- Use of deception to obtain information
- Actors prey upon human "willingness to be helpful"
 - Persuasive tactics
 - Psychological manipulation
- Has become a successful technique:
 - · System exploits often more difficult
 - Often easier to exploit human weakness
- Based upon principals of influence:
 - Reciprocity
 - Commitment
 - Social Proof
 - Authority
 - Liking
 - Scarcity









Ransomware Workflow Example



Cryptolocker Snapshot

Target Identified

User executed File executed

Infected target host info captured
Sent to attacker server


Dwell Time

Attacker server send encryption keys

Host files encrypted

Message Displayed

"clean up"
Remove the tracks










What About ATSC 3.0?






Network Models & ATSC 3.0 Layer Architecture






The ATSC 3.0 "stack" in detail




The ATSC 3.0 End-to-End Ecosystem

ROAD TO ATSC

- Broadcast Station
- Transmission
- Home Environment



Securing The Broadcast System





Securing The Transmission System



- ATSC 3.0 Inherent Mitigations ATSC A/360:2018
 - TLS
 - Transport Layer Security v1.2 / 1.3
 - IETF RFC 8446
 - DNSSEC
 - Domain Name Service Security Extensions
 - IETF RFC 6840
 - Cryptographically Signing
 - IETF RFC 5751
 - DRM Encryption



ATSC Standard: ATSC 3.0 Security and Service Protection



Securing the Home System

• ATSC 3.0 Presents a Diverse Environment:

- SmartTV
- OTT STB
- Dongle
- The "Home Gateway"
- Gateway Device
 - ATSC 3 Tuner
 - Broadband "Internet" Router
 - WiFi AP









The Home Network

Owner Responsibility

- Only Connect Devices That Need Internet
- Change Default Device Passwords Use Strong Passwords Unique for Each Device
- Segment Network Separate Networks (Media net / General Use net / Control net
- Keep Device Firmware Updated
- Disable uPnP (universal Plug & Play)
- Understand Cloud Service Based Apps
- Monitor Network Activity Know What is Connected Be Cautious of Open Ports










Mitigation & Prevention Tasks



OSI Model Layers & Attack Focus




The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is an abstract, conceptual model created by the International Organization for Standardization which enables diverse communication systems to communicate using standardized protocols. The OSI provides a standard for host – host communications over diverse network types.

Cybersecurity Mitigation - Where Do You Begin?

Securing the Broadcast IT System

- Securing the Network
 - Architecture
 - Harding devices
 - Protecting transmission paths:
 - Wired
 - Wireless
- Securing the Hosts
 - Operating System
 - Storage
 - Applications
- Recovery & Incident Response
 - Business continuity plan
 - Recovery:
 - Redundancy
 - Data backups




Securing the Network

- Security Begins With Network Architecture
- Segment Networks to Minimize Attack Surface
- Apply Best Practices Structured & Coordinated
- Follow the OSI Model for the Structure


Why segment?

- Performance enhancement
- Improved Security:
 - Attack plane minimized
 - Containment
 - Endpoint protection
 - Resource access minimized
 - Minimized "east-west" (lateral) movement



OSI Model for Structure & Coordination

"Defense in Depth principal: Approach based upon **coordinated** "<u>multiple layered</u>" security protections



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Securing the Host Devices

- Hardening is a process to <u>reduce the attack surface</u> of a host device operating system
- Implementation activities typically include:
 - · Changing default passwords
 - Removing un-used applications / services (de-bloating)
 - Deleting un-used accounts
 - Adjusting / changing default configurations
 - Strong password management
 - Keeping updates & patches up-to-date
 - Closing network "back doors"





Windows Op System

- Separate user and admin account(s
- Obfuscate local admin account (rename)
- Disable "guest" account(s)
- Insure "drivers" are patched up-to-date
- Disable "un-needed" services
- Utilize "domain controller" to administer multiple hosts with "caution"

Linux Op System

- Password protect the host BIOS
- Enable disk encryption
- Lock boot directory (read-only)
- Maintain system (kernel) updates & patches
- Disable / remove any un-used services (ie telnet, tftp, etc)
- Check for open ports (pen test)
- Secure SSH (change port, disable root login)
- Disable network parameters:
 - IP Forwarding
 - ICMP Re-Directs
 - Send Packet Re-Directs
- Set a "strong" password hashing algorithm (SHA512)
- Lock accounts after x failed login attempts (3-5)















Recovery & Incident Response

"Pre-determined course of action for a cybersecurity event"

- Have a recovery plan in place (proactive)
- Instructions to detect, respond & recover
 - Can be beneficial to recovering from a catastrophic event
- Incident Response Plan (NIST):
 - Preparation
 - Detection & analysis
 - Containment, eradication and recovery
 - Post-event activity
- Maintain data backups





National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce

Special Publication 800-61

Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

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
Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-61r2.pdf

Data Backup & Practices

- Often is the last resort course of action!
- Backup "best practices":
 - Maintain offline isolate backups
 - Mount target drive when required
 - Set backup drive as "RO"
 - Use "immutable" storage "WORM"
 - Mount drives only when necessary
 - Consider "intelligent" backup solutions
 - Match backup frequency to your business
 - Keep multiple backups multiple locations "3-2-1" rule
- Restoration practices
 - Know the restoration time required
 - Know the restoration priority dependencies
 - TEST, TEST, TEST restoration










Takeaway Thoughts & Resources



SHODAN

https://www.shodan.io



SHODAN

https://www.shodan.io

SHODAN

TOTAL RESULTS

TOP COUNTRIES

United States

Israel Brazil

Germany

Canada

More...

TOP PORTS

161

8081

8083

9000

80

1,388

Explore

Pricing **∠**

806

40

32

1,122

68

37

34

19

barix






FCC Working Group 4

CSRIC IV Working Group 4 (WG4) was given the task of developing *voluntary mechanisms* that give the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the public assurance that communication providers are taking the necessary measures to manage cybersecurity risks across the enterprise.¹ WG4 also was charged with providing implementation guidance to help communication providers use and adapt the voluntary NIST Cybersecurity Framework²

(hereinafter "NIST CSF").




Working Group 4 March 2015



9.1 BROADCAST SEGMENT
CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND BEST PRACTICES
WORKING GROUP 4
March 2015







The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is a United States federal agency, an operational component under Department of Homeland Security oversight. Its activities are a continuation of the National Protection and Programs Directorate.

CISA Insights
Combating Cyber Crime
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
Cyber Essentials
Cyber Incident Response
Cyber Safety











https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity

Shields Up

Supply Chain Compromise

Cybersecurity Governance

Cybersecurity Training & Exercises

Detection and Prevention

Education

Cyber EO 14028

Known Exploited Vulnerabilities

Directives

Ransomware Guidance and Resources

Cyber Hygiene Services

Information Sharing

Protecting Critical Infrastructure

Securing Federal Networks

Shop Safely

Multi-Factor Authentication



847 entries as of October 25, 2022









KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES CATALOG

MS-ISAC Ransomware Guide

Part 1: Ransomware Prevention Best Practices



Be Prenared

Refer to the best practices and references below to help manage the risk posed by ransomware and support your organization's coordinated and efficient response to a ransomware incident. Apply these practices to the greatest extent possible based on availability of organizational resources.

- It is critical to maintain offline, encrypted backups of data and to regularly test your backups. Backup procedures should be conducted on a regular basis. It is important that backups be maintained offline as many ransomware variants attempt to find and delete any accessible backups. Maintaining offline, current backups is most critical because there is no need to pay a ransom for data that is readily accessible to your organization.
 - Maintain regularly updated "gold images" of critical systems in the event they need to be rebuilt. This entails maintaining image "templates" that include a preconfigured operating system (OS) and associated software applications that can be quickly deployed to rebuild a system, such as a virtual machine or server.
 - Retain backup hardware to rebuild systems in the event rebuilding the primary system is not preferred.
 - Hardware that is newer or older than the primary system can present installation or compatibility hurdles when rebuilding from images.
 - In addition to system images, applicable source code or executables should be available (stored with backups, escrowed, license agreement to obtain, etc.). It is more efficient to rebuild from system images, but some images will not install on different hardware or platforms correctly; having separate access to needed software will help in these cases.
- Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan that includes response and notification procedures for a ransonware incident.
- Review available incident response guidance, such as the Public Power Cyber Incident Response Playbook (https://www.publicpower. org/system/files/documents/Public-Power-Cyber-Incident-Response-Playbook.pdf), a resource and guide to:
- Help your organization better organize around cyber incident response, and
- Develop a cyber incident response plan.
- The Ransomware Response Checklist, which forms the other half of this Ransomware Guide, serves as an adaptable, ransomwarespecific annex to organizational cyber incident response or disruption plans.

Part 2: Ransomware Response Checklist



Should your organization be a victim of ransomware, CISA strongly recommends responding by using the following checklist. Be sure to move through the first three steps in sequence.


Detection and Analysis

- ☐ 1. Determine which systems were impacted, and immediately isolate them
- If several systems or subnets appear impacted, take the network offline at the switch level. It may not be feasible to disconnect individual systems during an incident.
- If taking the network temporarily offline is not immediately possible, locate the network (e.g., Ethernet)
 cable and unplug affected devices from the network or remove them from Wi-Fi to contain the infection.
- After an initial compromise, malicious actors may monitor your organization's activity or communications to understand if their actions have been detected. Be sure to isolate systems in a coordinated manner and use out-of-band communication methods like phone calls or other means to avoid tipping off actors that they have been discovered and that mitigation actions are being undertaken. Not doing so could cause actors to move laterally to preserve their access—already a common tactic—or deploy ransomware widely prior to networks being taken offline.


Note: Step 2 will prevent you from maintaining ransonware infection artifacts and potential evidence stored in volatile memory, it should be carried out only if it is not possible to temporarily shut down the network or disconnect affected hosts from the network using other means.

- \Box 2. Only in the event you are unable to disconnect devices from the network, power them down to avoid further spread of the ransomware infection.
- ☐ 3. Triage impacted systems for restoration and recovery:
- Identify and prioritize critical systems for restoration, and confirm the nature of data housed on impacted systems.
 - Prioritize restoration and recovery based on a predefined critical asset list that includes information systems critical for health and safety, revenue generation, or other critical services, as well as systems they depend on.
- Keep track of systems and devices that are not perceived to be impacted so they can be deprioritized for restoration and recovery. This enables your organization to get back to business in a more efficient manner.
- \Box 4. Confer with your team to develop and document an initial understanding of what has occurred based on initial analysis.
- \square 5. Using the contact information below, engage your internal and external teams and stakeholders with an understanding of what they can provide to help you mitigate, respond to, and recover from the incident.
- Share the information you have at your disposal to receive the most timely and relevant assistance. Keep management and senior leaders informed via regular updates as the situation develops. Relevant stakeholders may include your IT department, managed security service providers, cyber insurance company, and departmental or elected leaders.

https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA MS-ISAC Ransomware%20Guide S508C.pdf







https://blog.knowbe4.com/infographic-q2-2021-users-falling-for-security-hr-phishing-attacks


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Do These 13 Things

(if nothing else)

- Accept Their is NO SINGLE Solution! Implement multiple protections "DiD"
- **Segment** your network (VLAN) reduce attack surface & east-west movement enhance performance
- Utilize Ethernet switch port security features
- Change default login credentials Use unique & strong passwords (paraphrases)
- Separate Admin & User accounts on hosts (WIN)
- Limit access (users & applications) apply principal of "least privilege"
- Control access use packet filtering (ACL and/or firewall) deny by default SSH & MFA
- **Disable / minimize** services not required close/block ports **minimize** macros / RDP use
- Monitor you IT infrastructure / network know what is normal
- Use "intelligent" host backup solutions test backup restoration follow "3-2-1" rule
- Keep systems updated / patched use KEV to guide priorities
- Utilize signature based deep-packet inspection antivirus/malware keep updated (often daily)
- Don't overlook social engineering engage & educate users phishing is alive and effective





A single "phishing" attempt can instantly negate your efforts!

The Cybersecurity Challenge

Ultimate Network Security



Question if a "critical" host device needs public network access!

Recognize remote access is not the same as public network access!


Closing Thoughts


- Cybersecurity is an ongoing process use routine cyber hygiene
- Have the proper segmented network design
- Follow OSI model to implement structured / coordinated approach:
 - Physical security
 - Utilize layer 2 Ethernet switch port security features
 - Utilize layer 3 packet filtering & encryption
- Use authenticated encrypted remote access (2-factor & VPN)
- Use packet filtering Firewall "housekeeping" is essential
- Use of the Internet Protocol Brings Unique Features to ATSC 3
 - IP Opens Door to Cybersecurity Threats
 - ATSC 3 Too New to Understand Real Threats
 - Beware of the Home Network!
- Be Careful Out There The Weakest Link Determines System Security!

A single successful "phishing" attempt can instantly negate your all your cybersecurity efforts!











Questions?

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Distinguished Lecturer

